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                           ____________ 
 
O'NEILL, District Judge: 
     Petitioner Gary Doctor appeals the dismissal of his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  The court below dismissed the 
petition because: (1) Doctor failed to exhaust his state remedies; 
and (2) the Pennsylvania courts refused to consider the merits of 
his direct appeals based on an independent and adequate state 
procedural rule.  We conclude that Doctor did not exhaust his state 
remedies and that it would not be futile to require him to raise 
his unexhausted claims under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief 
Act. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46 (Supp. 1996).  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district court's dismissal of Doctor's petition.  
Because Doctor may resubmit his petition with only exhausted claims 
we also address the district court's second basis for dismissing 
the petition and hold that the fugitive forfeiture rule as applied 
to Doctor was not an independent and adequate state procedural rule 
which would bar federal habeas corpus review. 
     Doctor was charged with aggravated assault in July, 1985. On 
June 24, 1986, during the lunch recess of his criminal bench trial, 
and following the presentation of the Commonwealth's case, Doctor 
fled.  Upon Doctor's failure to return, the trial court issued a 
bench warrant and recessed the proceedings.  On August 29, 1986, 
the trial court entered a guilty verdict against Doctor, apparently 
without conducting any further proceedings or attempting to inform 
Doctor, his attorney or the Commonwealth about its intention to 
enter a verdict.  
     Doctor remained at large for over five years until he was 
arrested on January 25, 1992 in Butler County, Pennsylvania.  On 
April 14, 1992, the trial court sentenced Doctor to a term of 49 to 
98 months.  On June 5, 1992, Doctor filed a pro se "Petition for 
Habeas Corpus" in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Appendix 279-284, 
which was denied on August 21, 1992.  While that petition was 
pending, he filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court.  On May 13, 1993, the Superior Court, without 
reaching the merits of any of his claims, quashed Doctor's appeal 
pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 1972(6).  This fugitive forfeiture rule 
allows a Pennsylvania appellate court "to quash" an appeal "because 
the appellant is a fugitive."   The Superior Court then denied 
Doctor's Application for Reargument.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Doctor's Petition for Allowance of Appeal without 
opinion on November 29, 1993.  Thereafter the United States Supreme 
Court denied Doctor's petition for a writ of certiorari.  
     On November 29, 1994, Doctor filed a pro se habeas corpus 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The district court, 
adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, 
dismissed Doctor's petition without considering its merits.  Doctor 
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  On September 19, 
1995, the district court granted Doctor's request for a certificate 
of probable cause to appeal and appointed counsel for him.   
     The district court had jurisdiction over this matter under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction under §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our 
review of whether petitioner has exhausted his state remedies is 
plenary.  Ross v. Petsock, 868 F.2d 639, 640 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
                            EXHAUSTION 
     Generally, a § 2254 petition which includes any unexhausted 
claims must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
all state created remedies.  Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).  
To satisfy the exhaustion requirement the petitioner must present 
every claim raised in the federal petition to each level of the 
state courts.  Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).  The 
petitioner must afford each level of the state courts a fair 
opportunity to address the claim.  Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 
(1982).  The petitioner's state court pleadings and briefs must 
demonstrate that he has presented the legal theory and supporting 
facts asserted in the federal habeas petition in such a manner that 
the claims raised in the state courts are "substantially 
equivalent" to those asserted in federal court.  Bond v. Fulcomer, 
864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d. Cir. 1989).  The state courts need not 
discuss or base their decisions upon the presented claims for those 
claims to be considered exhausted.  Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.   
     The district court, adopting the findings of the magistrate 
judge, concluded that "Doctor's 6th Amendment claim was never 
presented to any Pennsylvania appellate court." Appendix at 301.  
     In his § 2254 petition Doctor asserts the following grounds 
for relief: 
     No record of trial of Absentia said to have been held on 
     Aug. 29th 1986 - I was not convicted in a court of law - 
     I was never told on record or otherwise I was found 
     guilty - I was never given any appeal rights before or 
     after sentencing. No attorney is on record to have 
     represented me in the mysterious absentia trial held - 
     the trial transcripts in my case stop on page 129 at 
     which time case was continued generally, this was on June 
     25, 1986. The court docket shows a conviction date of 
     8/29/86 - written in on April 14, 1992 - The trial court 
     Judge has written an opinion on Oct. 2, 1992 and cited 
     cases (Com. v. Jones) 1992 and Com. v. lines, 609 A.2d 
     134 pa. Super 1992. These cases do not apply to me - but 
     are only stated to keep another court from reviewing the 
     record and transcript both which will reveal there was no 
     trial of absentia on Aug. 29th, 1986 - my Rights to 
     appeal is and has been obstructed by lower Court's false 
     opinion and misconduct. 
     (Grounds) 
     1. Due Process 14th Amendment  
     2. Right to Appeal 
     3. Post Verdict Rights 
     4. 6th Amendment 
     5. Insufficient Evidence. 
 Appendix at 144-45. 
     On appeal Doctor states that his § 2254 petition includes a 
Sixth Amendment claim alleging a deprivation of his right to 
trial.  See Appellant's Reply Brief at 3 ("By depriving Doctor of 
a trial, of course the Trial Court also deprived Doctor of all 
other Sixth Amendment rights, . . . But the critical violation, 
from which all other violations arose, was the deprivation of a 
trial.").  Doctor claims that the trial court entered a guilty 
verdict against him without conducting any further proceedings inabsentia 
or otherwise.  We must decide whether Doctor has satisfied 
the exhaustion requirement by affording all levels of the 
Pennsylvania courts a fair opportunity to address this claim.  
Because we find that he has not adequately presented this claim to 
either the Pennsylvania Superior Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, we conclude that he has not. 
     Doctor's brief to the Superior Court on direct appeal did not 
include the Sixth Amendment claim he now asserts.  In that brief 
Doctor raised four issues:  
 
     (1) whether the Defendant became a fugitive before post-trial 
     proceedings commenced thereby waiving his rights to proceed on 
     appeal; (2) whether mailing notice to Doctor's address is 
     sufficient notice to satisfy constitutionally required due 
     process whenever an individual may suffer a deprivation of his 
     liberty; (3) whether the trial court's failure to advise 
     Defendant of his Rule 1123 rights, which results in 
     defendant's failure to file Post-Verdict Motions, constitutes 
     a waiver by Defendant of appealable issue; and (4) sufficiency 
     of the evidence.   
See Appendix at 172-73.  The due process claim raised in the 
Superior Court brief challenges only whether Doctor received 
constitutionally required notice of a trial in absentia.  The brief 
does not raise the issue of whether a trial in absentia ever 
occurred.  See Appendix at 183-84.  Though inadequate notice of a 
trial may implicate Sixth Amendment concerns, a claim arising from 
that lack of notice is distinct from a claim that no trial inabsentia was 
ever held.  Following the Superior Court's May 13, 
1993 order which quashed his right to appeal, Doctor filed an 
Application for Reargument in the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  
Appendix at 202-05.  In this application Doctor, through counsel, 
stated:  
     the Trial Court's decision to continue Appellant's trial 
     allows that Court to render a verdict in absentia, absent 
     proof that Appellant received notice of the new trial date and 
     then failed to appear.  This Court's decision permits the 
     prosecution and determination of guilt of an individual inabsentia 
without notice of any proceedings.  The same is a 
     gross violation of the due process required by both the United 
     States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.  
Id. at 203-04.  Doctor argues that this claim, without explicitly 
invoking the Sixth Amendment, incorporates it by reference to 14th 
Amendment due process.  Even if this were so, mere invocation of a 
legal principle is insufficient to apprise the state courts of the 
facts and legal theories of the claim he now asserts.  We therefore 
cannot find that a claim concerning the adequacy of notice of a 
trial in absentia is "substantially equivalent" to a claim that no 
trial in absentia ever occurred as is necessary to satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement.  See Bond, 864 F.2d at 309.  Thus, the 
Superior Court did not have a fair opportunity to address Doctor's 
Sixth Amendment claim that the trial court never conducted a trial 
in absentia.      
     Nor did Doctor state the instant Sixth Amendment claim in his 
brief to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In that brief Doctor 
framed the issues as follows: 
     (1) whether the Superior Court's decision to quash Doctor's 
     appeal is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's 1993 
     decision in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States; (2) whether the 
     Superior Court's decision to quash Doctor's appeal is contrary 
     to Commonwealth v. Harrison, 432 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. 1981); 
     (3) whether the Trial Court's reliance on Pa.R.A.P. 1972(6) is 
     in error, and in violation of both the United States and 
     Pennsylvania Constitutions; and (4) whether prosecution inabsentia 
without notice of proceeding is a gross violation of 
     an individual's Constitutional right to due process. 
See Appendix at 221.  This brief did not assert that a trial inabsentia 
was never held.   
     Doctor argues, however, that he presented his Sixth Amendment 
claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a separate, pro sepetition 
brought pursuant to 43 Pa.C.S. § 721 and filed on June 
24, 1992.  In that petition, Doctor asserts "Defendant...was 
convicted in Pittsburgh, Penna. was denied due-process, under 5th 
and 14th Amendment under United States Constitution and Article 1 
section 9 of Pa. Constitution."  Appendix at 280.  He further 
asserts "[d]efendant again is denied due process under 5th and 14th 
Amendment of U.S. Constitution, and Under Article 1 section 9 of 
the Pa. Constitution; by being sentenced without an official 
verdict of guilt."  Id. at 281.  Doctor does not allege in this 
petition that a verdict was entered without the trial court ever 
conducting a trial in absentia.  Though this challenge to the 
validity of the verdict does touch upon Doctor's challenge to the 
deprivation of his right to a trial, it falls short of raising the 
legal theory and facts supporting the Sixth Amendment claim he now 
asserts.  Thus Doctor has not afforded the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court a fair opportunity to address his claim.  See Bond, 864 F.2d 
at 309.  
     Moreover, Doctor filed his original petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus before he filed his appeal to the Superior Court.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition 
per curiam and without opinion: (1) while his direct appeal to the 
Superior Court was still pending; and (2) over a year before Doctor 
filed his Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  Under Pennsylvania law habeas corpus relief is not 
available "if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing 
proceedings authorized by law,"  42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b), and "may be 
invoked only when remedies in the ordinary course have been 
exhausted or are not available; the writ is not a substitute for 
appellate review."  Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 605 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Pa. 
Super.), appeal denied, 612 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992) (citations 
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. McNeil, 665 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. 
Super. 1995) (same).   
     Under these circumstances, even if his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court included the Sixth 
Amendment claim now asserted, his claims were untimely and the 
exhaustion requirement would arguably not be satisfied.  SeePitchess v. 
Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (exhaustion requirement is 
not satisfied where denial of extraordinary writ cannot be fairly 
read as an adjudication on the merits of the claims and appellate 
review is available); Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). 
     Doctor's attempts to present to the Pennsylvania appellate 
courts his claim that the trial court never conducted a trial inabsentia 
does not "represent substantial compliance with the . . . 
exhaustion requirement."  Bond, 864 F.2d at 309.  Therefore, Doctor 
must exhaust his state remedies before he can seek federal habeas 
relief unless such an attempt would be futile.  Toulson v. Beyer, 
987 F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
                             FUTILITY 
     Doctor argues that even if he has not effectively exhausted 
his Sixth Amendment claim requiring him to return to state court 
would be futile because the Pennsylvania courts, having already 
determined that he waived his right to a direct appeal, will not 
address a petition under the PCRA.  
     Though in general a § 2254 petition which includes any 
unexhausted claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust all 
state remedies, Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, this requirement does not 
apply when the unexhausted claims are procedurally barred.  In such 
a case, although the unexhausted claims may not have been presented 
to the highest state court, exhaustion is not possible because the 
state court would refuse on procedural grounds to hear the merits 
of the claims.  Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987 (citations omitted); Clark 
v. Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 1142, 1147 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989).  In such 
instances compliance is excused because any further attempts to 
assert the claims would be futile.   
     A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies is, however, 
excused only when state law "clearly foreclose[s] state court 
review of [the] unexhausted claims."  Toulson, 987 F.2d at 987.  If 
the federal court is uncertain how a state court would resolve a 
procedural default issue, it should dismiss the petition for 
failure to exhaust state remedies even if it is unlikely that the 
state court would consider the merits to ensure that, in the 
interests of comity and federalism, state courts are given every 
opportunity to address claims arising from state proceedings.  SeeVasquez 
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986); Toulson, 987 F.2d at 
987.  In the instant case, all avenues of direct appeal are clearly 
foreclosed.  Therefore, we must determine whether state collateral 
review is "clearly foreclosed," as to render further state 
proceedings futile.   
     Collateral review of a criminal conviction is available in 
Pennsylvania under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 
9541-46 (Supp. 1996).  To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that the claim has not been waived.  § 
9543(a)(3).  "[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have 
raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during 
unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 
proceeding."  Id. at § 9544(b)(3).  As the Pennsylvania courts have 
noted, "nearly all claims are waived under the PCRA since nearly 
all claims potentially could have been raised on direct appeal.  
This applies even if the first-time petitioner never has obtained 
appellate review."  Commonwealth v. Eaddy, 614 A.2d 1203, 1207-08 
(Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 626 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1993); 
accordCommonwealth v. Stark, 658 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 1995).  Thus 
it appears that on collateral review the Pennsylvania courts would 
hold that Doctor waived the right to assert his Sixth Amendment 
claim on at least one of two separate grounds: (1) because his 
submissions to the Superior Court and/or the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court failed to raise that claim; and (2) because under the 
fugitive forfeiture rule he waived all rights to have his claims 
considered.  However, we find that PCRA review is not clearly 
foreclosed because Doctor may be able to demonstrate a "miscarriage 
of justice" warranting "departure from the PCRA's stringent 
eligibility requirements."  See Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d 
1185, 1193 (Pa. Super. 1995) (Hoffman, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 1996). 
     There are limited exceptions allowing assertion of a claim 
that would be considered waived.  In Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 
A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
issues never raised on direct appeal or in previous postconviction  
petitions are deemed waived, precluding their consideration in 
successive postconviction petitions, unless the petitioner can 
demonstrate a "miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society 
can tolerate."  Petitioner must demonstrate: (1) that the 
proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society can 
tolerate; or (2) actual innocence.  Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 633 
A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1993).  A miscarriage of justice "can only 
occur where it is demonstrated that a particular omission or 
commission was so serious that it undermined the reliability of the 
outcome of the proceeding.  Where a conviction can be shown to 
result from a breakdown in the adversary process, the conviction 
rendered is unreliable.  Such a conviction is obviously prejudicial 
to the defendant and, if allowed to stand, is a miscarriage of 
justice."  Lawson, 549 A.2d at 112 (Papadakos, J., concurring). 
          Doctor alleges facts that could support a finding that 
"the proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society can 
tolerate."  Szuchon, 633 A.2d at 1100.  Doctor's allegations and 
citations to evidence in the record indicate that a judge entered 
a verdict against him without convening any proceedings in open 
court and without any semblance of resuming adversary proceedings.  
These contentions could be construed as giving rise to a claim of 
a serious breakdown in the adversary process.  Such allegations, if 
true, raise concerns much more serious than defects in a trial that 
do not entirely negate the existence or appearance of a public 
trial as required by the Sixth Amendment.  Cf. Lawson, 549 A.2d at 
110 (allegation that trial did not timely commence does not 
demonstrate a miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Williams, 
660 A.2d 614, 618 (allegation that petitioner was not informed of 
the elements of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere, that 
his speedy trial rights were violated, and that the sentence 
imposed exceeded the guidelines and abused discretion did not 
indicate a miscarriage of justice). 
     The exhaustion requirement reflects concerns of comity and 
federalism which require this Court to give state courts first 
opportunity to "consider allegations of legal error without 
interference from the federal judiciary."  Hillery, 474 U.S. at 
257.  Although exhaustion may be excused where return to the state 
courts would be futile, we must be certain that state review is 
clearly foreclosed lest we deprive state courts of an "opportunity 
to correct their own errors, if any."  Toulson, 987 F.2d at 989 
(citation omitted).  It is therefore not for this Court to decide 
whether the Pennsylvania courts will conclude that the defects in 
the proceedings surrounding Doctor's conviction rise to the level 
of a miscarriage of justice as defined by Pennsylvania law.  We 
cannot conclude that there is no chance that the Pennsylvania 
courts would find a miscarriage of justice sufficient to override 
the waiver requirements and permit review under the PCRA.  
Accordingly, we conclude that a return to state court would not be 
futile. 
                        PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
     Though the foregoing analysis mandates dismissal of Doctor's 
petition and thus affirmance of the court below, Doctor may 
resubmit a petition asserting only his exhausted claims. Lundy, 455 
U.S. at 520.  Should this occur the district court will again be 
faced with the question of whether Doctor is entitled to federal 
habeas review of his procedurally defaulted claims.  Therefore, in 
the interests of judicial economy we will address the district 
court's holding that the fugitive forfeiture rule bars federal 
habeas review of Doctor's claims.  A petitioner is entitled to 
federal review of procedurally defaulted claims only if he can 
demonstrate that (1) the procedural rule was not "independent" and 
"adequate" or (2) cause for his failure to comply with state 
procedural rules and prejudice resulting th 
